

MARAUDING TERRORIST ATTACKS

Supplementary Guidance:
Preparing personnel



National Protective
Security Authority



**COUNTER
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This guidance document is part of a series titled "*Marauding Terrorist Attacks: Making your Organisation Ready*".

It is intended to be circulated by NPSA Advisers and Counter Terrorism Security Advisers (CTSA) to key individuals within UK-based organisations.

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INTRODUCTION

Intended audience

This document is intended for organisations in the public and private sectors. It is most useful for:

- Physical Security Managers
- Security Control Room Managers
- Security Control Room Supervisors
- Training Managers.

Scope

Marauding Terrorist Attacks (MTAs) are fast-moving, violent attacks where assailants move through a location aiming to find and kill or injure as many people as possible. Most deaths occur within the first few minutes, before police are able to respond.

This document is supplementary to “*Marauding Terrorist Attacks: Making your organisation ready*”, which discusses how your organisation can recognise an attack, take immediate action and facilitate the police.

The response of the police to such attacks is detailed within national guidance (Operation Plato). That guidance refers to a wide range of attack methods, from attacks of low sophistication, such as those, using bladed weapons or vehicles, through to more complex attacks involving firearms or explosives. The emergency services’ response to an Operation Plato declaration is supported by a set of agreed principles. These Joint Operating Principles (JOPs) have been developed by the Home Office and the emergency services community in order to ensure that there is an interoperable response.

This document presents and expands upon content from the main document relating to personnel in a manner to assist your organisation in developing a programme to raise awareness and provide training. It discusses:

- Developing your awareness and training programme
- Preparing all personnel using ‘Run, Hide, Tell’ as applied to your organisation
- Preparing personnel in the security control room
- Preparing front-line personnel including receptionists, concierges, stewards and guards.

The guidance builds on the principles of ‘Run, Hide, Tell’ (published by the National Counter Terrorism Security Office, NaCTSO. See *Annexe A: STAY SAFE: Terrorist firearms and weapons attacks*).

Why prepare personnel for marauding terrorist attacks?

Preparing personnel improves their ability to recognise a marauding terrorist attack and enables them to make choices that will save their own lives and those of others. Organisations have a duty of care to their personnel to offer them the best chance of surviving an attack.

All personnel

In the event of an attack, unprepared people are more likely to put themselves and others at risk. For example, during the attack on London Bridge and Borough Market in June 2017, although staff locked the glass doors to a restaurant, both staff and customers remained in full view rather than hiding, thus attracting the attention of the knife-wielding terrorists.

All personnel can be an asset to your organisation's security. Vigilant personnel who are confident in recognising and reporting suspicious behaviour may not only provide early warning of an attack but may even deter an attack that is still being planned.

Personnel in the security control room

If your organisation has a security control room, its operators will be responsible for completing time-critical, key tasks in the event of an attack. Marauding terrorist attacks are one of the most challenging incidents your personnel will ever face. Fortunately, they are also rare and most people will never encounter one. This means that training and rehearsal are the only ways for your personnel to gain and practice the necessary skills.

Front-line personnel

Front-line personnel including receptionists, concierges, stewards and guards are highly valuable in deterring potential attackers, recognising an attack in its early stages and providing guidance to personnel and members of the public. They are also more exposed and therefore at greater risk. Preparing these personnel, particularly those whose primary role is not security, to recognise attacks quickly and empowering them to respond appropriately can dramatically reduce the impact of an attack on your organisation.





DEVELOPING YOUR AWARENESS AND TRAINING PROGRAMME

Your awareness and training programme will require support from senior management to allocate resources and personnel's time. Security and front-line personnel in particular will require an on-going allocation of time to practice and rehearse the necessary skills, many of which they are unlikely to use in the course of their normal job.

Building confidence and reassuring personnel

Terrorism aims to instil fear in all people that may be targeted. If delivered without care, an awareness and training programme can frighten personnel, helping the terrorists achieve their aim.

Ensure that your programme works instead to build confidence in your personnel and provide reassurance. Personnel who are able to control their fear will act more quickly and make better decisions during an attack.

Key points to emphasise are:

- Marauding terrorist attacks are rare
- Your organisation is taking action to deter and defend against a potential attack
- The training they are receiving will enable them to take action whilst at work or elsewhere in order to survive an attack in the unlikely event that one occurs.

Increasing awareness

It will take time for your organisation to develop and refine procedures to respond to a marauding terrorist attack. Before you are able to develop a training programme based on these procedures, your organisation may need to:

- Make design changes to your organisation's site and buildings
- Install additional security systems
- Develop, test and refine response procedures, coordinating with neighbours and landlords
- Train security personnel such as operators in the security control room
- Develop a plan to identify and deliver first aid to casualties.

In the meantime, you should introduce your personnel to the concept of an attack and provide simple guidance for responding, for example through an auditorium presentation, intranet content and/or email.

The National Counter Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO) publishes a short video¹ that offers a useful introduction to how an attack may look and an overview of the action your personnel should take. Counter Terrorism Policing (CTP) publishes training materials², including videos, aimed at children aged 11 as part of the 'ACT for Youth' programme.

Site personnel have a key role in the identification and delivery of first aid to casualties. Encourage personnel to download and use the smartphone apps developed by Citizen AID³ and St John's Ambulance⁴. The applications offer information about the provision of first aid to trauma victims.

This information can be provided to all personnel as detailed plans and training are put in place in relation to the delivery of first aid.

¹ STAY SAFE video: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/stay-safe-film>

² ACT for Youth: <https://www.npcc.police.uk/CounterTerrorism/ACTforYouth.aspx>

³ <https://www.sja.org.uk/>

⁴ <https://www.citizenaid.org/>

Applying Run, Hide, Tell in your organisation

People must recognise an attack and take action to run or hide. Inaction may cost people their lives.

People should take action following the principles of 'Run, Hide, Tell' (published by the National Counter Terrorism Security Office, NaCTSO). These general principles were written as part of a public awareness campaign and are intended to be applicable to any location. Organisations must build on these principles to enable personnel to make the best choices using knowledge of the site, its capabilities and your organisation's emergency procedures.

Escaping from the threat and leaving the area of an attack altogether is ideal. However, running is not always the best option. Attempting to leave a location may bring people into the path of oncoming attackers. If lockdown (locking doors to separate people from attackers) is instigated at your organisation's site, people are likely to be safer staying in a locked area that attackers cannot reach. People who are less able to escape, such as young children and those with health conditions or impairments should reach a nearby lockable room to shelter and hide.

Changes to your site to enable people to orientate themselves, navigate and easily escape whilst doors and other obstacles delay attackers also improve their chances.





PREPARING ALL PERSONNEL

Aims

Your training programme should enable personnel to:

- Recognise a marauding terrorist attack
- Understand what to do to survive a marauding terrorist attack
- Understand your organisation's response procedures
- Understand how your site or building would be evacuated
- Understand whether lockdown would be instigated and how it would function
- Become familiar with announcements they may hear
- Understand their surroundings in the context of a marauding terrorist attack; escape routes and hiding places
- Assist visitors
- Assist those less able to escape such as young children and people with health conditions or impairments.

Understanding a marauding terrorist attack

Terrorists typically use a quiet location where they expect not to be disturbed to make final preparations, ready weapons and wait for the appropriate moment to make their final approach to the target and launch the attack.

They then enter a busy area aiming to kill or injure as many people as possible. The attackers next begin marauding, travelling on foot or in a vehicle, to find and kill more people. Attackers are drawn by movement and deterred by seemingly unoccupied locations as well as by anything that may take time and effort to overcome, such as a locked door. The terrorists may take hostages, resulting in a longer siege. Attacks may conclude with the arrest, death or escape of the terrorists.

Marauding terrorist attacks can take many forms:

- A lone attacker, multiple attackers or multiple groups of attackers
- Arrival at a location on foot, in a vehicle or an attack perpetrated by insiders
- Entering without using force or forcing entry using an explosive device, a vehicle, coercion of someone with access or a combination thereof.

Most deaths occur during the initial attack and before police are able to respond.

Figure 1: Typical concurrent MTA attack and response phases



Recognising a marauding terrorist attack

Recognising an attack can be difficult. The sounds made by an explosion or gunshots may only be audible in the immediate vicinity and the cause of screams from an attack with bladed weapons or as a vehicle runs over pedestrians may not be immediately clear. Furthermore, when people encounter rare situations, such as a terrorist attack, they can be inclined not to believe what they are seeing, wasting valuable time. Raising people's awareness of attacks improves the likelihood they will recognise one.

Often the first indication of an attack is people moving in the same direction forming a large crowd. However, the cause of this may not be possible to discern and there may not be a threat. For example, at Oxford Circus tube station, London in 2017, an altercation between two people on the platform resulted in a large crowd running from the area, falsely believe a marauding terrorist attack was in progress.

How people react to a marauding terrorist attack

Preparing people for an attack can greatly influence their behaviour and improve their chances of survival. How people respond to a marauding terrorist attack depends on a variety of factors including:

- Their awareness of the general threat of marauding terrorist attacks
- How alert they are to their surroundings
- Whether they can hear an attack, particularly noises caused by explosives or firearms
- Whether they can see an attack
- The reactions of those around them
- Whether they have rehearsed their response.



People may be in a state of disbelief that a terrorist attack is occurring, taking no action at all or taking action that puts them in danger such as approaching the attackers or beginning to film using a smartphone.

Stress and fear cause different reactions in individuals. The body's physiological response to stress can lead to loss of peripheral vision and reduced hearing as well as a diminished ability to make decisions and process verbal instructions. People may:

- Freeze, being temporarily unable to process information or make decisions
- Flee, typically leaving using familiar rather than optimal routes or following a crowd
- Fight, even when their chances of winning are low.



When the best of course of action is unclear, people are led by the actions (or inaction) of those around them. This means that people may follow a crowd, even when others in the crowd are no better informed.

Visitors and members of the public

Visitors and members of the public are likely to be less able to recognise an attack as well as less familiar with your organisation's site layout, environment and procedures. Basic information could be provided to visitors on arrival, for example by attaching it to any visitor's pass with which they are issued. Posters or videos could similarly be used provide basic information to members of the public.

However, it is unrealistic to expect these people to be prepared for an attack and they could take action that puts themselves and others in danger. In the event of an attack, knowledgeable personnel should guide these people on what to do.

People less able to escape

Personnel should be trained on your organisation's procedures for those less able to escape such as young children and people with health conditions or impairments. A strong option for these people is to reach a nearby lockable room (ideally with blinds covering internal windows and basic soundproofing) to shelter and hide. They may require assistance, though your organisation should be realistic how capable personnel will be of offering it in a high-stress situation.

Run, Hide, Tell

Run applied in your organisation

Locating the threat and deciding whether to run

People's senses, primarily sight and hearing, are the best way to identify a nearby threat. Information from announcements is useful when the attack is further away. They should use their knowledge of your organisation's response procedures and information from announcements to determine whether they should move from their location or hide where they are.

Possible destinations to which to run

People should understand to where they could run. Your organisation's procedures will state whether people should flee inside your site or building (typically if there are security barriers that may be closed to protect them from the attack) or outside the perimeter. Some buildings may require a phased evacuation to avoid a crush. Typical destinations are:

- A building or site exit, followed by leaving the area
- A purpose-built shelter area that offers increased protection⁵
- Lockable rooms in which to shelter and hide
- High floors and centres of buildings if attackers are locked outside.

Possible routes for reaching those destinations

Personnel should be made familiar with your site's layout. It is important that they are shown potential escape routes that they may not normally use such as service stairwells.

In order to understand announcements that contain location information, personnel should know the names of thoroughfares, stairwells as well as entry and exit points in the manner they will be announced.

In the event of an attack, personnel should be able to understand how the location of the attackers (established using their senses or through announcements) relates to their location and be able to decide upon a route to escape from the threat.

People in unfamiliar locations tend to leave using the route they used to enter. Whilst under stress, people prefer familiar routes, even where they are far from optimal. Personnel should ensure that their choice of escape route is a consciously made.

Avoiding following a crowd without thinking

People have a tendency to follow a crowd, even when individuals in that crowd are no better informed. Personnel should be trained to make their own decisions as to where to run and the route to take.

Moving quietly

Marauding attackers searching for victims are attracted to sound. Personnel should move quickly but quietly to avoid attracting attention.

Rapid dispersal

Once outside the immediate area of the attack, people should disperse and leave the area. Your organisation should have procedures for accounting for personnel in the aftermath of an attack.

Personnel should not congregate at formal or informal assembly points (such as those used for fire evacuations or nearby cafés) since this makes them vulnerable to marauding attackers or a secondary attack.

Running during a lockdown

A lockdown of a building or site can be a highly effective way of protecting personnel by putting one or more locked barrier between them and the attackers (for more information on lockdown see the supplementary guidance document "*Marauding Terrorist Attacks: Lockdown*").



⁵ NPSA guidance on security walling: <https://www.npsa.gov.uk/security-walling-systems> and A guide to security walling systems for the protection of important assets⁴

Personnel should understand how lockdown would function on your site and how they will know it has been instigated (typically it will be announced). People who do not understand the protection offered by a lockdown may put themselves or others at risk by leaving a locked area rather than hiding.

Electrically locked doors often have a mechanism by which they may be opened in the event of a fire (typically with 'break glass' unit, actually made of plastic). In many installations, activating this mechanism will release the lock until it is manually reset, potentially allowing attackers to enter an area where personnel would otherwise be protected. It is important that ramifications of using these mechanisms to leave a locked area are understood.

Hide applied in your organisation

Recognising opportunities for hiding

Lockable hiding places with substantial walls such as purpose-built shelters, back offices and meeting rooms all provide strong options for sheltering and hiding.



Where these are not available or cannot be reached, more opportunistic hiding places can be very effective since attackers typically move so quickly through areas searching for victims. Examples include cupboards, under desks, behind piled boxes or behind doors, such that the person hiding cannot be seen when the door is opened. Training exercises using a fast-paced version of hide-and-seek are a great way to demonstrate the value of opportunistic hiding places and improve people's ability to recognise opportunities for hiding in their work environment.

Using locks, door blockers and barricades

Marauding terrorists are deterred by any door, particularly those that are locked or difficult to open. Hiding personnel should lock barriers where they are able.

If your organisation has deployed door blockers (a security device to prevent doors from being opened) your personnel should be trained on how to use them. Personnel should be mindful that such devices may reveal that someone is present in a room. Door chains should be avoided for this reason.

Barricading doors using furniture can be effective though personnel should ensure that from the outside the door appears to be locked since a visible barricade (for example, one that can be seen through a glass door panel) or a door that can be partially opened reveals that a room is occupied.

Removing lines of sight

Drawing blinds over internal windows and closing doors, even when they cannot be locked, removes lines of sight for the attackers, making it less likely that people will be found.

The importance of silence

Marauding terrorists seeking victims are attracted to sounds. When hiding it is important that personnel remain silent so that it appears that an area is unoccupied. Mobile phones and other devices should be put in silent mode with vibrate turned off.

This importance of remaining still

The human visual system is highly attuned to movement. It is important that personnel who are hiding remain still to avoid attracting the attention of marauding terrorists seeking victims. Even in rooms without windows, movement may be apparent from the outside in changing light patterns around doors.

Making an area seem unoccupied

An area may be made less interesting to a marauding attacker by making it appear unoccupied, for example by switching off lights and monitors in a meeting room.

The risks of using mobile phones and other devices

Personnel may use their mobile phones or other devices to report the attack to police, reach out to family and friends or post on social media.

Using electronic devices:

- Generates noise that may be heard by an attacker
- Requires movement that may be seen by an attacker
- Lights up an area that may draw the attention of an attacker.

Devices should be set to silent with vibrate switched off and the screen dimmed. They should only be used when it is clear that there is no immediate danger.

The danger of filming attackers

Some people may attempt to film attackers using their mobile phone. This carries a high risk of attracting the attention of attackers who may see the person filming, the phone itself or be attracted to the inevitable movement.

It should be emphasised to personnel that filming not only risks their life but the lives of all other personnel hiding in the same area, which may otherwise be ignored by marauding attackers.

Hiding during a lockdown

Personnel should hide, remaining still and silent during a lockdown. In the absence of other victims, attackers will try to break in to a locked area where it is clear people are taking shelter.

Tell applied in your organisation

When to call for help

People's first priority should be ensuring their safety by running and/or hiding. Making phone calls should only be attempted once personnel are not in immediate danger. However, it is crucial that a police response is obtained as swiftly as possible. People should not assume that the police have already been called.

Personnel should be mindful that using a phone may put them in danger; see section The risks of using mobile phones and other devices. The situation may change whilst they are waiting to speak to police call handler (a surge of callers may result in calls being held in a queue) or in conversation, since calls may take several minutes.



Whom to call

Personnel should understand whether they should report the attack to police or the security control room first. The former is recommended. Personnel should be told if their organisation routes emergency calls on the internal telephone system to the security control room.

Contacting the police by telephone

Calling 999, asking for police and speaking with a call handler is the most efficient way to contact the police. Where the call handler cannot confirm a response, the caller can press 55 to be connected to police, though they will need to speak quietly to give details. The location of a mobile phone is not automatically sent to a police call handler.

Contacting the police by text message for people who are deaf, hard of hearing, or speech-impaired

It is possible to contact the police by text message, using the emergencySMS service which is aimed at people who are deaf, hard of hearing, or speech-impaired. However, it is necessary to register a phone number before using the service⁶ by sending the word 'register' to 999 followed by 'yes'.

Emergency messages should contain the service to be contacted, the nature of the emergency and the location, ideally with precise address and landmarks. For example "Police. Knife attack. Inside Nibbles Pizza. Glossop Road Sheffield S10".

What information to convey

When communicating with police it is important to be specific and accurate. Calling the police is covered in detail for security personnel and the guidance can also be applied to training other personnel. See section Calling and updating the police.

Posting to social media

Personnel may seek to post to social media to inform friends and family that they are safe. If doing so (see section The risks of using mobile phones and other devices) personnel should be careful to post only facts and not speculation or rumours that may cause widespread confusion. Insensitive photographs such as pictures of dead or injured people, should never be posted.

⁶ emergencySMS service: <https://www.ngts.org.uk/how-to-use-ngt/contact-999-using-ngt.html>

Rehearsing the response

Rehearsing a response to a marauding terrorist attack allows personnel to put training principles into practice. Whilst full response rehearsals involving your whole organisation offer the best learning experience, much can be achieved with smaller scale rehearsals that cause minimal disruption.

For example:

- A subset of personnel could rehearse an evacuation where attackers are nominally blocking a possible escape route
- Personnel sharing an office could rehearse hiding; finding places to hide, locking doors and remaining still and silent for a short period
- Personnel could rehearse making a call to the police, practicing relaying relevant information in a concise manner.





PREPARING SECURITY AND FRONT-LINE PERSONNEL

Personnel with a security role must act quickly and correctly to minimise the impact of a marauding terrorist attack. Those with a role are not limited to dedicated security personnel (such as security control room operators and guards) and include stewards, receptionists, concierges and building facilities managers.

Empowering all personnel with a security role to make decisions to counter a marauding terrorist attack prevents unnecessarily delays that may cost lives. Where these personnel are trained and your organisation is confident in their ability, the National Protective Security Authority (NPSA) recommends that they are permitted to instigate response procedures rather than waiting for a senior colleague to investigate and confirm.

In the event of an attack, there are a number of critical tasks that must be completed before police arrive (see Figure 2: Suggested priorities for response tasks to be completed by security and front-line personnel. Your organisation must determine its response priorities and ascertain what is realistic through planning and testing.). It is important to test response plans to ensure they are realistic; NPSA's research has shown that organisations underestimate the difficulty of tasks and overestimate how much can be accomplished with a given number of security personnel.

Figure 2: Suggested priorities for response tasks to be completed by security and front-line personnel. Your organisation must determine its response priorities and ascertain what is realistic through planning and testing.

CRITICAL	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Detect the attack and make a rapid initial assessment Call, update and facilitate police Alert personnel and members of the public to take action Decide whether to instigate lockdown and use any active delay systems
IMPORTANT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Alert neighbours Keep personnel and members of the public updated Make a detailed assessment Direct front-line personnel
OTHER	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Contact senior management Record events, decisions and actions

The responsibility for completing response tasks should rest with operators in your organisation's Security Control Room (SCR) if it has one. Organisations without a security control room must allocate responsibility for critical tasks to appropriate personnel. Typically this should be front-of-house personnel such as security guards, receptionists and concierges who are most likely to recognise an attack first.

NPSA's research has shown that preparation significantly improves the performance of security personnel.

Knowledge of response procedures

Security and front-line personnel will be primarily responsible for making operational decisions in the event of an attack. It is essential that they have a comprehensive knowledge of your organisation's response procedures so that they are able to implement decisions that have been carefully thought through in advance. It is valuable to include security personnel during table-top exercises.

Evacuation

Buildings are designed for evacuation in the event of a fire, not a terrorist attack. It may take many minutes for buildings to be evacuated with some requiring a phased evacuation to avoid a crush. Security personnel should understand how an evacuation would function at your site.

Lockdown

Lockdown means locking doors and other physical barriers (such as turnstiles) to restrict entry to and/or exit from a site or one or more zones within a site. Analysis of historic attacks and NPSA's research have shown that instigating lockdown in the event of a marauding terrorist attack is a highly effective way of reducing casualties.



Unfortunately, NPSA has found that security and front-line personnel are often insufficiently prepared for lockdown. These personnel must understand:

- How lockdown would function at your site
- The circumstances in which lockdown would be instigated
- How lockdown integrity would be monitored
- Who has the authority to instigate lockdown
- The importance of telling people that lockdown has been instigated
- How to make an effective announcement about lockdown
- The procedure for cancelling lockdown
- Procedures for common scenarios.



Further information on lockdown, including a list of common planning considerations, is available in the supplementary document "*Marauding Terrorist Attacks: Supplementary Guidance – Lockdown*".

Reassurance of senior management support

Security and front-line personnel have significant responsibility in the event of an attack. They may need to take action, such as initiating a lockdown that may save many people whilst leaving others in danger. People can hesitate when they are fearful of making an incorrect decision for which they may be blamed, which costs lives in the context of a marauding terrorist attack.

Personnel should be reassured that they will have the full support of senior management when implementing procedures that have been planned and agreed.

Recognising a marauding terrorist attack

Security personnel should understand what the initial stages of marauding terrorist attack might look like from their perspective; for example when viewed through their security systems (such as video monitoring and attack detection systems). Detecting an attack directly using video monitoring is difficult. Secondary indicators such as a running crowd or casualties lying on the floor are more easily spotted.

Training should focus on likely forms of attack that your organisation's risk assessment has identified.

Calling and updating the police

The initial call to the police using the 999 emergency number is key to obtaining a police response as swiftly as possible and should be made as soon as an attack has been recognised. The ambulance and fire services need not be called separately.

NPSA's research has shown that 999 calls made by security personnel are often poor, with the caller being unprepared to supply the type of information that was required, telling the operator their incorrect interpretation of what was happening rather than what they had seen and ending the call prematurely, preventing them from providing ongoing updates. Training and practice bring improvement.

Conveying the initial information is likely to take several minutes. It is important to be specific and accurate. The caller should stay on the line to keep the police updated as the attack progresses and more information becomes available.

Understanding the conversation with a police call handler

The call will be made at a time when the caller is under extreme pressure, having just detected the attack or whilst in hiding. The police call handler will also be coming under increasing pressure as there is a rapid surge in the number of calls as a result of the attack.

Police will be seeking to triage calls and rapidly identify callers who have crucial information. The caller needs to facilitate this process by providing the key information in a useful format. When the caller is an operator in the security control room or, for sites without a security control room, the person primarily responsible for calling police, the caller should identify themselves as such and tell the police call handler that it is crucial that the line is left open if they are in a position to provide live updates of key information.

What information to provide

The police call handler is likely to ask scripted questions. The caller may have valuable information that has not been specifically requested; this information should also be provided. If the police do not recognise that the caller has key information and the ability to provide more, the 999 call may be dropped in order to answer other outstanding calls.

The caller should report:

- That an armed terrorist attack is taking place now
- The address of the site where the attack is underway
- Their role at the site; for example the principal security officer or an operator in the security control room



- Any current and reliable information they have about the attack, particularly:
 - The number and descriptions of attackers
 - The number and type of weapons (knives, pistols, assault rifles, etc.) used
 - The current location of the attackers and the ability to track the attackers and provide updated information
 - The number of casualties
- The current best access routes into the site, if known
- Whether they are able to provide information about other security capabilities at the site, such as video monitoring, locking down and securing the venue, the location of safe rooms
- Whether they are able to use a public address system to pass information to people at the site.

If the police call handler believes a caller has critical information about the incident the call may be passed to a specialist police officer or they will call back. The role of the police is to obtain as much information about the ongoing situation as possible.

Each police force will have similar but bespoke call handling protocols. You should use the information available in *"Marauding Terrorist Attacks: Supplementary Guidance: Working with police and other emergency services"* to work with your local police and other emergency services planners to agree the information they require immediately to initiate the response.

Clarifying unfamiliar and ambiguous terms

Personnel talking to police call handlers and the responding police officers should be aware that members of the emergency services use certain terms that have a specific meaning, which may differ from everyday use. Emergency services use their own terminology to describe the layout of buildings and sometimes use the phonetic alphabet to describe attackers and members of the public. NPSA's research has shown that this can cause misunderstandings. Personnel must not attempt to use emergency services' language and must seek clarification where meaning is unclear.

Similarly, personnel must use plain language and remember that the police call handler and responding police officers are unfamiliar with their site, its layout and its naming conventions.

Assisting police when they arrive

When police arrive at your site they may ask for assistance or provide instructions on what to do next. These may include:

- Requesting a concise report on the current situation
- How to obtain floor plans, keys and access tokens for the site
- Asking for a person with knowledge of the site to attend the Forward Command Post; the location from which the emergency services' response is managed
- Changes to lockdown to facilitate police access
- Specific content for announcements
- Sirens or alarms at the site to be switched off.

Additional information is available in *"Marauding Terrorist Attacks: Supplementary Guidance: Working with police and other emergency services"* about how to work with the police as they arrive at an attack.

Making announcements

Announcements are a highly valuable method of alerting, guiding and reassuring personnel in the event of an attack. Effective announcements can:

- Save lives by helping people avoid attackers
- Alter people's behaviour by providing current and relevant information
- Reassure personnel and ensure they remain hidden whilst there is still a threat.



Many security personnel do not make live voice announcements as part of their day-job and certainly not under pressure. NPSA's research has shown that both the content and delivery of announcements are critical for personnel to take action. It has also shown that security control room operators often make poor announcements that are inaudible, rambling, vague, misleading, incorrect and lack credibility. Training and practice has been shown to significantly improve the quality of announcements.

Guidance on making effective live announcements is available in the supplementary document *"Marauding Terrorist Attacks: Supplementary Guidance: Working with police and other emergency services"*.

Communicating using radio

Radio systems are typically used for communication between with security personnel and sometimes for communication between neighbouring organisations (for example shops on a high street). Systems commonly have a shared channel where only one person can broadcast at any one time.

NPSA's research has highlighted that security personnel seldom practice radio communications in the context of an emergency; personnel talk over one another, broadcast unnecessarily long, rambling messages blocking others on the channel and ask for updates rather than trusting that updates will be provided when available. It is crucial that personnel are concise when conveying information and are fluent in your organisation's radio protocol (such as saying 'over' when ending a transmission that expects a reply and 'out' when ending an exchange).



Effective communication becomes more difficult under pressure and it is important that this skill is regularly practiced following training.

Rehearsals

Many of the skills required to respond to a marauding terrorist attack are different from those required during business-as-usual. It is vital that security control room operators rehearse their role following training.



Operator performance significantly improves with practice. Rehearsals need not be disruptive and are usefully undertaken on a single system as well as using a combination of systems. For example:

- A security control room officer could practice making clear and concise announcements using a public address voice announcement system appropriate for a possible attack scenario playing out
- A video wall could be used during busy hours to attempt to track a member of the security team taking a possible attack route through your site
- Radio communications protocol could be rehearsed by working through a scenario with guards and a security control room operator in different rooms.



PREPARING SECURITY CONTROL ROOM OPERATORS

NPSA's research has shown that security control room operators are unclear on what tasks need to be completed and whose responsibility each task is, resulting in duplication of effort and essential tasks being forgotten. Planning, training and rehearsal improve the response capability of the security control room.

NPSA is undertaking research to better understand the training needs of security control room operators. Additional guidance will be forthcoming.

Understanding roles and responsibilities

Roles for responding to a marauding terrorist attack must be defined and assigned tasks to be completed. The precise roles depend on the number of operators and the capabilities at your site. For example, roles for a three-person security control room might be:

- Assessor and tracker: responsible for making the initial assessment, using security systems to track attackers and gathering more information
- Police liaison; responsible for making the 999 call, updating and facilitating police
- Announcer and lockdown operator; responsible for making announcements, instigating lockdown and monitoring its status.

NPSA's research has shown that organisations often overestimate what each operator is able to accomplish. It is important to test response procedures at your site to determine how roles are best defined.

Clear leadership

In the event of an attack, there must be no confusion about who is in charge in the security control room. Establish a clear order of succession so that whichever operators are on duty and present, there is always someone who will take charge.

Communicating with other security control room operators

Security control operators need to work together to complete key tasks. For example, one operator may be tracking the location of attackers whilst another is announcing the attackers' location to enable personnel to make well-informed decisions.

NPSA's research has shown that poor quality communication between security control room operators significantly degrades the quality of the overall response. It is rare that security control room operators need to work so closely under such pressure. Regular practice provides an opportunity to build skills and working relationships.

Technical competency using security and communication systems

Ensure operators are trained on all systems in the security control room. Marauding terrorist attacks typically require a different configuration of systems such as a different arrangement on a video wall. Operators should be confident operating systems in that configuration.

Working with security systems to accomplish tasks effectively

As well as knowing how to operate each system, security control room operators should understand how to use systems to best effect to accomplish tasks specific to marauding terrorist attacks. For example, an operator tasked with tracking attackers should understand that a gunshot detection system may offer a rapid way of locating attackers but using video monitoring systems allows individual attackers to be tracked even when they are not firing.



Record keeping

When there is time available to do so without delaying other tasks, security control room operators should create a record of the incident detailing:

- What happened and when
- What decisions were made, why and when
- What action was taken and when.

Practicing record keeping following rehearsals improves this skill as well as providing an opportunity for personnel to reflect on areas for improvement highlighted by the rehearsal.

An automated system (such as a video and audio recorder) can be used to record the actions operators take and can also be useful to review following a rehearsal.

Securing systems on evacuation of the security control room

It may be necessary to evacuate the security control room, for example in the event of a fire. To ensure that security and monitoring systems cannot be used by attackers, the systems should be secured as the room is abandoned. Operators should know the procedure to be followed. Typically, simply locking the door to the security control room is adequate and ensures the operators may exit swiftly.





PREPARING FRONT-LINE PERSONNEL

Personnel in front-line roles such as guards, concierges, receptionists and stewards have additional preparation considerations.

Working without a security control room

For organisations without a security control room, the responsibility for completing critical response tasks should be allocated to appropriate personnel. Typically, this should be front-line personnel who are best placed to recognise an attack. It is unlikely that it will be possible to complete tasks additional to those that are critical without placing personnel in danger. Two-way communication with any landlord's security control room is essential.

There is a risk that front-line personnel may be killed or injured before they are able to complete their assigned tasks. Plan for more than one person to complete a task to offer redundancy. It is crucial that the police are called and therefore does not matter if they receive more than one call from the same organisation.

Keeping safe

Personnel in front-line security are more likely to be involved in the early stages of a marauding terrorist attack. Organisations should ensure that these personnel are aware of the procedures specific to their post, which should enable them to ensure their own safety whilst looking after the safety of others. For example, a front-desk receptionist may be instructed to press a panic button before running and hiding in a lockable room close to the desk.

Guiding personnel and members of the public

Front-line personnel are in a position to guide other personnel and members of the public in what action they should take, in accordance with the organisation's response procedures. This may include directing people towards escape routes or guiding them to a location they may shelter and hide such as a back-office area.

Dealing with difficult situations

It is likely that front-line security personnel will need to handle difficult situations. Your organisation should plan appropriate responses, capture them in operating procedures and provide opportunities for security personnel to practice.

Such situations include:

- A crowd running towards an entrance (should the door be locked?)
- A vehicle hitting one or more cyclists or pedestrians outside the building (should the door be locked in case an attack is beginning or should the injured people be offered first aid?)
- Personnel shut outside of an area that has been locked down (should they be let in?)
- Personnel who want to leave an area that is locked down (should the door be opened?)
- Prioritising dealing with medical emergencies or protecting their own safety and that of other personnel
- Handling people who refuse or are unable to follow instructions.

Terrorist attacks are intended to cause violence towards people and are likely to cause fatalities and severe injuries. A very common issue is major bleeding. Research into serious injuries shows that the quicker casualties are treated, the greater their likelihood of survival.

The Manchester Arena Inquiry has recommended that to help save lives, first aid training relevant to the injuries that are most likely to occur should be undertaken. During an incident, a Security Control Room (SCR) has a crucial role in the mobilisation and support provided to those giving first aid.

It is critical to provide an expert medical intervention as quickly as possible. In the absence of such a response being immediately available first aid should be provided as soon as it is safe. Where multiple casualties have been caused, attention should be focused on providing first aid to the most seriously injured. This will include those who:

- Have major bleeding, such as a severed limb, open wound or substantial blood loss
- Are unresponsive with absent or abnormal breathing.

First aid should only be provided when a decision has been made that the immediate threat from the attack has diminished and it has been assessed that the scene is safe to enter. The SCR should establish that there is no immediate risk from the attackers and there are no significant risks created as a result of the attack on buildings or other infrastructure.

As the attack ends and before the emergency services can provide a significant response, there is likely to be a period during which the actions of the SCR can have a considerable impact as:

- Deploying people to give first aid, to the right location, with the right equipment will save lives
- Gathering information about the number, nature and location of casualties and passing it to the emergency services will enable them to rapidly mobilise.

Consideration should now be given to the planning, training and testing and exercising that can be completed in advance of an attack. Sites will improve the response to any incident if consideration has been given as to what could occur and a plan has been developed to enable the response. This should include consideration as to the nature and number of injuries that could be caused if the threats identified as being of greatest risk were delivered, and the first aid response to them.

Further guidance is available in:

- NPSA guidance titled *“Responding to Terrorist Incidents – Developing Effective Command and Control. Supplementary Guidance – First Aid”*
- The National Counter Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO) have published a first aid awareness product which informs the considerations to providing safe and effective first aid following a terrorist incident⁷

Assisting and reporting to responding police officers

Police officers arriving at the site may ask front-line personnel for assistance or a concise report of the current situation. See section *Calling and updating the police*.

Further information

For guidance specific to your site and organisation contact your NPSA adviser.

⁷ First Aid advice during a terrorist incident: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/first-aid-advice-during-a-terrorist-incident>

ANNEXE A: STAY SAFE: TERRORIST FIREARMS AND WEAPONS ATTACKS⁸

Firearms and Weapons attacks are rare in the UK. The 'STAY SAFE' principles tell you some simple actions to consider at an incident and the information that armed officers may need in the event of a weapons or firearm attack:



RUN

- Escape if you can
- Consider the safest options
- Is there a safe route? RUN if not HIDE
- Can you get there without exposing yourself to greater danger?
- Insist others leave with you
- Leave belongings behind.



HIDE

- If you cannot RUN, HIDE
- Find cover from gunfire
- If you can see the attacker, they may be able to see you
- Cover from view does not mean you are safe, bullets go through glass, brick, wood and metal
- Find cover from gunfire e.g. substantial brickwork / heavy reinforced walls
- Be aware of your exits
- Try not to get trapped
- Be quiet, silence your phone and turn off vibrate
- Lock / barricade yourself in
- Move away from the door.



TELL

Call 999 - What do the police need to know?
If you cannot speak or make a noise listen to the instructions given to you by the call taker.

- Location - Where are the suspects?
- Direction - Where did you last see the suspects?
- Descriptions – Describe the attacker, numbers, features, clothing, weapons, etc.
- Further information – Casualties, type of injury, building information, entrances, exits, hostages, etc.
- Stop other people entering the building if it is safe to do so.

⁸ Annexe content from:

<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/recognising-the-terrorist-threat/recognising-the-terrorist-threat#stay-safe--terrorist-firearms-and-weapons-attacks>

ARMED POLICE RESPONSE

- Follow officers instructions
- Remain calm
- Can you move to a safer area?
- Avoid sudden movements that may be considered a threat
- Keep your hands in view.

OFFICERS MAY

- Point guns at you
- Treat you firmly
- Question you
- Be unable to distinguish you from the attacker
- Officers will evacuate you when it is safe to do so.

You must STAY SAFE

- What are your plans if there were an incident?
- What are the local plans? e.g. personal emergency evacuation plan.

Further advice

Additional information about the treatment of casualties and the equipment available to support their treatment at:



Accredited First Aid training and suppliers of first aid products.
www.sja.org.uk/



Free information on how to stay safe and treat casualties before the 999 services arrive. Suppliers of first aid products.
www.citizenaid.org

ACRONYMS

AACS	Automated access control system
ADS	Active Delay Systems
ARV	Armed Response Vehicle
CBRN	Chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear
CCTV	Closed Circuit Television
CNI	Critical National Infrastructure
CSO	Chief Security Officer
CTSA	Counter Terrorism Security Adviser
FCP	Forward Command Point
GDS	Gunshot detection systems
HART	Hazardous Area Response Teams
HM	Her Majesty's
JESIP	Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme
JOP	Joint Operating Principles
LED	Light emitting diode
LRF	Local Resilience Forum
MERIT	Mobile Emergency Response Incident Team
MTA	Marauding Terrorist Attack
MTFA	Marauding Terrorist Firearms Attack
NaCTSO	National Counter Terrorism Security Office
NCTP	National Counter Terrorism Policing
NHS	National Health Service
NPSA	National Protective Security Authority
PA-VA	Public Address - Voice Alarm
PHE	Public Health England
PPE	Personal Protective Equipment
PTZ	Pan Tilt Zoom camera
RVP	Rendezvous point
SCR	Security Control Room
SMS	Short Message Service - Text
SOPs	Standard Operating Procedures
STAC	Scientific and Technical Advice Cell
TIC	Thermal Imaging Cameras
TCG	Tactical coordination group
VAW	Vehicle as a Weapon attack

GLOSSARY

Airsoft weapons	Airsoft guns are replica weapons used in sports and firearms training. They are essentially a special type of very low-power smoothbore air guns designed to shoot non-metallic spherical projectiles which are typically made of plastic or biodegradable resin materials. The pellets have significantly less penetrative and stopping powers than conventional air guns, and are generally safe for competitive sporting and recreational purposes if proper protective gear is worn.
ASCEND	NPSA's MTA work involves the repeated physical simulation of an MTA in a building environment – Project ASCEND. This involves subjecting a building population to a simulated attack and looking at factors that can either improve or reduce survivability before the arrival of an armed police response.
CitizenAID™	CitizenAID™ empowers the general public in situations of emergency and allows them to be effective in aiding the injured with medical support prior to the arrival of emergency services. It is comprised of simple and logical actions and is designed to guide the public to react safely and effectively as well as communicate correctly with emergency services. The powerful combination of organisation and treatment will save lives in dangerous situations.
Exercises	Allow personnel to validate plans and readiness by performing their duties in a simulated operational environment. Activities for a functional exercise are scenario-driven. A full-scale exercise would involve a live time simulation of a potential real event and involve multi-agency participation.
Hostile Incursion	As per MTA however the intent of those involved may be broader than terrorism.
Hostile reconnaissance	The information gathering phase by those individuals or groups with malicious intent, is a vital component of the attack planning process.
JESIP	A programme created specifically to further improve the way ambulance, police and fire and rescue services operate together on scene in the early stages of their response to major incidents.
Lockdown	Lockdown means locking doors and other physical barriers (such as turnstiles) to restrict entry to and/or exit from a site or one or more zones within a site. It is sometimes referred to as 'dynamic lockdown'.
Maglocks	The Magnetic lock or mag lock uses an electrical current to produce a magnetic force. When a current is passed through the coil, the magnet lock becomes magnetised. The door will be securely bonded when the electromagnet is energised holding against the armature plate.
Marauding	As defined by Cambridge Dictionary - Going from one place to another killing or using violence, stealing, and destroying.

GLOSSARY

MTA	<p>Marauding Terrorist Attacks can take many forms.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A lone attacker, multiple attackers or multiple groups of attackers • Arrival at a location on foot, in a vehicle or an attack perpetrated by insiders • Entering without using force or forcing entry using an explosive device, a vehicle, coercion of someone with access or a combination thereof • Attackers armed with bladed weapons, guns, pipe-bombs, petrol bombs or multiple weapons.
PA-VA	<p>PA-VA systems are used for making announcements or providing public information and delivering automatic alarm and emergency messages. Public Address (PA) systems (often known as Tannoy Systems) and VA (Voice Alarm) systems provide a quick and simple means of direct and clear communication. Voice Alarm (VA) or Voice Evacuation Systems are used for delivering pre-recorded emergency messages.</p>
Personnel	<p>Used to describe any member of staff, contractor, visitor or other occupant to a building</p>
RUN HIDE TELL	<p>The National Counter Terrorism Policing's Stay Safe campaign to advise the public how to respond if they are caught up in an firearms or weapons attack.</p>
Security Control Room	<p>The hub of a site's security, continuously receiving information from a range of security staff and systems. Many of the principles of an SCR can be carried over into an event or operations control room.</p>
Security Management System	<p>Integration of technical security systems, such as access control and CCTV, into a single management platform.</p>
Security Fog	<p>Thermally generated white smoke specifically used as a security measure. Current security smoke machines use glycol or glycerine mixed with distilled water to produce a dense white fog which obscures vision and presents a confrontational barrier to any intruders.</p>
Situational Awareness	<p>Being aware of what is happening around you in terms of where you are, where you are supposed to be, and whether anyone or anything around you is a threat to your security and health and safety.</p>
Table top exercise	<p>Discussion based sessions where team members meet to discuss their roles during an emergency and their responses to a particular emergency situation. A facilitator guides participants through a discussion of one or more scenarios.</p>
Vulnerable people	<p>Those who may need to be provided with assistance or special arrangements made, such as children and people with health conditions or impairments.</p>